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XVIII. THE WESTERN WORLD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: 
THE HISTORICAL SETTING 
lo International Anarchy (1900-1918) 
It is probable that most people, if asked to list the 
characteristics of the Western World in this century, would place 
at or near the top of their list something.about international 
rivalries. Curiously enough, a similar poll conducted in Europe 
and North America in 1900 would likely have given equal prominence 
to the idea that the world had entered a period of increasing 
international amity, 
This idea was certainly plausible. No major war had involved 
two or more of the great powers since 1871. There had been no 
general war since Napoleon's defeat in 1815,, The partition of 
Asia and Africa had been largely completed, without provoking war. 
Improved communications were bringing people closer together, and 
it was widely held that the more the peoples of the world knew of 
each other, the more they would like each other. Improved com-
munications also Hasteheff^^t growth of an international ernnnmy, 
in which the various parts were mutually dependent. International 
capitalisffi-5 an<i it&-op»onent.^__international socialism, were accys-
tomed to transcending national The convening of dis­
armament conferences seemed to suggest that statesmen realized that 
improved weapons made war so disastrously destructive that there 
were no longer victors and vanquished, only fellow sufferers. The 
foundation of orjiajilzationa-JLlke-the ,ln,texjiata.onal-Red Cross. (1863) 
showed that hximanitarians too knew no national boundaries. Already 
governments were learning to cooperate with each other in bodies 
like the Universal Postal Union (1875), Nevertheless, despite 
these and other impressive indications of international amity, the 
fact remains that in 1914 the planet was plunged into what we call 
World War I, 
How did such a catastrophe happen? The first factor to 
note is the independent state system within which international 
affairs operated, Th^ wm-i H was di vl_di5d-.-ijitQ snvpreign states, 
each a law unto itself, ^ d none owinp; anep;iance to ,any such 
larger concept as Europe. Christendom. or mankind. HerewaS" 
the b^asic element of international anarchy, Many of these po­
litical units were nation-states, while those nations not inde­
pendent ardently desired that status. Owing to the way in which 
nations were intermingled, rare thf European state 
which did not have some of its fellow nationalsli vin^ out^de 
its frontiers or. within its Tro^nt lira. "some foreign nationality 
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clamoringfor national self-determination. The problem was 
particularly acute for the multiha^Eional guasiaa, Austro-
Hungarian, andTurkish empires and for the small states of the 
Balkan peninsula. ~~5yTr9Ti, inany nations were fatalistically 
convinced that they could achieve the fruition of their desires 
only at the expense of others. 
National rivalries were intensified by colonial and eco­
nomic rivalries. In the scramble for colonies, some powers 
were latecomers or weak contestants, and even the most success­
ful failed to achieve all that they wanted. The resultant 
legacy of humiliation and frustration was hardly calculated to 
smooth international relations. Although the livelihood of 
many now depended directly on the free international movement 
of goods, capital, and labor, all sta^tea. contained groups whose 
prosperity was injured or threatened by foreign competition, 
l^ven though minorlTies, sucE~gToups were "oTten abTe to exert 
pressure quite disproportionate to their size. The high tariff 
walls which were a tribute to their power further increased 
friction. 
To cope with the economic and other aspects of interna­
tional relations was no mean task for public op±jxxon. nnuri shed 
by inadequate education and a press wM was often sensational. 
Yet with the spread of democratic institxTn^olis'^bric opinion 
was able, and indeed required, to influence governmental deci­
sions. Unfortunately, all too often the public was swayed by 
selfish, ambitious, or ill-informed leaders. The man in the 
street, faced*with successive diplomatic crises which he under­
stood only poorly, was apt to greet war with positive relief. 
The long years of peace had erased the memory of what war was 
really like. On the battlefield, at any rate, theissug^ 
seemed clear and one could distinguish between friend-and—foe. 
F^ar psychosis in the public mind was inpart the product of 
the armamenTs~race. A"s~more "a^ "terrible armaments were 
produceirijynp^ o^  ^ in search of security, a premium was placed 
on declaring war at a favorable time. Whoever got in the first 
blow had an immense advantage. Consequently, purely mii-ita-ry 
CQnsA^era:4^i nms assiumpd an i rnip; in diplomacy, revers­
ing the dictum that "war is merely diplomacy carried on by 
other means." In the crisis which prerip-j tated war in 1914. 
military authorities must bear some of the blame for frustrat­
ing attempts, at pacifIcatlQn^-
The immediate cause of this crisis was the assassination 
of the heir~" to tne Austrian throne bv a Serb nationalist whn 
wanted to' liberafeIf^ XloM:.-SfixbS - living under Au§Jsxiaa--j^ .^ 
Austrian military leaders, always fearful that nationalism 
would destroy their multinational state, pressed for a pre­
ventive war against Serbia. Germany announced that she would 
stand by Austria, her only dependable ally. Russia, afraid 
that if Serbia was destroyed her own influence in the Balkans 
would disappear, came to the aid of Serbia. France stuck to 
her ally, Russia. Thus, tlie alliance system, which had divided 
the European great•powers—into two armed camps, helped spread a 
local conflict across tbe continent. 
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Germany's military leaders endeavored to knock out their 
enemies by methods which created more enemies. In so doing 
they were taking a calculated risk, hoping to win the war be­
fore the potential of the new enemies could be effectively 
mobilized0 They aimed a massive offensive against France 
through neutral Belgium, thereby bringing Britain into the 
conflicts The knock-out failed and the contestants settled 
down to prolonged and bloody trench warfare in northern France. 
Germany tried next to starve out Britain with a submarine 
blockade. Her sinking of neutral shipping was the occasion for 
the United States' declaration of war in 1917, The techniques 
of modern warfare made the role of a neutral a difficult one 
indeed. Some powers, for example Italy and Japan, deserted 
this role when offered booty by Britain and France. Eventu­
ally a total of twenty-four states were arrayed as the Allies 
against the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and Turkey)„ 
Tjiat the war lasted as long as it did is a tribnto -Hig 
ability Qf_ the modern stale_Jlq.roobillze its resQurces_i„jjaiaxlal, 
human, aad^ldejalQglcal.. However, by 1918, despite intensive 
'"regulation of what in modern total war is called the home front, 
the European belligerents on both sides were approaching ex­
haustion. The first power-JLo crack under internal and external 
pressures wg,s Russia. In 1917 the tsarist government was over­
thrown by a liberal and radical coalition, which was in turn 
supplanted by the Bolsheviks who accepted humiliating peace 
terms from the Central Powers. Nevertheless, the Allies proved 
to have superior resources and in the autumn of 1918 the Central 
Powers collapsed. 
For the next two years representatives of the victors were 
busily engaged in imposing on the vanquished a series of 
treaties^ known collectively as the Paris Peace Settlement 
(1919-20) . President Woo«1row~¥41rson5--w4io~4ar~^a~ tliofi^^ headed the 
American delegation.to the conferences, hoped to establish a 
lastlng_jp£a££_based on national self-determinatlon and inter­
national cooperation. Thanks to widespread disgust with prewar 
diplomacy J whl^~was popularly blamed for the recent holocaust, 
he was able to carry his point on a number of issues. The Turk­
ish and Austro-Hungarian empires were broken up, and their ter­
ritories divided among a number of nation-states (for example, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia)^ some newly created. 
Never before had the political map of Europe been drawn more 
nearly in accord with national groupings. A League of Nations 
was estAb_llshed to provide a forum..where ifiTerTiaTtTonll^ 
coulC bie..-^-e.ttljgd, amicably it was hoped. However, old and new 
fears, ambitions, and hatreds were not to be denied and on many 
issues the treaties were much harsher than Wilson had envisaged. 
The vanquished ..^vere r^eguir ed J;o jf OX-.caus ing 
the war j, ,shoulder a heavy burden of debts to the All^e^, dl^§arm 
uniiaterally, and sifrCTder all overseas colonies and eveiL.£uro-
pean territpJOL^-Oataijalng . In short, "they were 
treated as second-class citizens. Thus, the settlement after 
one war helped foment the next. 
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In spite of all this, the vjears- from 19?,1 to 1929 brought 
spme^ rela^^utxon of-dAtejpnartioHftl--tensrirott»-,—thanks 1 argelyZtpl^ 
rel^tTve"]^osperlty, the pressure of pwxeiy~ domesti.c_,issu 
an^ fear of another waF7~"'Treague membership was granted the de­
feated powers. Their financial obligations were lightened some 
what. Preliminary steps were taken toward general disarmament. 
Probably the best symbol of the new spirit — and of its pre­
carious nature — was the Kellogg-Briand Pact, (1928) "iii^ which 
uIJtJijiately sixty-two states^T^hounced aeSr^sive war as an in­
strument of natTonal policy. Peace was to be achieved in. a 
new Holy Alliance at the-SicXQke_-xxL a,.pen^  
